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I. INTRODUCTION
When 60 Minutes, in November 1995, refused to air Mike Wallace's
interview with Jeffrey Wigand, the highest level tobacco company executive
to break ranks with the industry and reveal what insiders allegedly knew about
the dangers of smoking, CBS suffered a barrage of criticism in the name of the
First Amendment.' CBS pulled the interview after being threatened by Brown

* Law Clerk, the Honorable Jos6 A. Cabranes, U.S. Ct. App., 2d Cir.; J.D. 1997, Yale Law
School. I would like to thank Owen M. Fiss for reading a draft of this article and for providing
helpful comments.
1. See, e.g., Lawrence K. Grossman, CBS, 60 Minutes, and the Unseen Interview, COLUM.
JOURNALISM REV. Jan./Feb. 1996, at 39, 47, 49 (discussing opponents' views of CBS's decision
to suppress the tobacco story). 60 Minutes eventually aired the interview after the Wall Street
Journalpublished excerpts from a deposition of Wigand taken in a Mississippi class action suit
against the tobacco industry. See Jane Hall, 60 Minutes Will Present Withheld Tobacco
Interview, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1996, at F2.
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& Williamson Tobacco Corporation, Wigand's former employer, with a suit
for tortious interference with contract.2 Brown & Williamson accused CBS of
interfering with contracts in which Wigand had pledged not to disclose
confidential information learned as a result of employment. 3 First Amendment
specialist James Goodale called Brown & Williamson's efforts to suppress
Wigand's disclosures "'the most important press issue since the Pentagon
Papers.'" 4
While the controversial Wigand interview has received much attention,5
a less dramatic, but no less significant, First Amendment issue has gone
largely unnoticed: namely, the enforceability of the employee confidentiality
agreements that were the basis of Brown & Williamson's threatened suit
against CBS, agreements that increasingly are a condition of employment
contracts and severance packages." Confidentiality agreements traditionally
have been an effective way for employers to prevent trade secrets from being
leaked to competitors.7 But what about Jeffrey Wigand, who has been sued
by Brown & Williamson for violating his confidentiality agreements, 8 or
others like him who disclose inside information-not for the benefit of
competitors-but for the benefit of the general public? Should courts enforce
confidentiality agreements against private employees when the disclosures at
issue concern matters of public interest?
Courts have not yet seriously examined this question,9 although they
2. See Gail Diane Cox, HardballLegalManeuversCowNews Media Titans,NAT'L L.J., Jan.
8, 1996, at B1, Bi.
3. See id.
4. Marie Brenner, The Man Who Knew Too Much, VANITY FAIR, May 1996, at 170, 174.
5. See Brenner, supra note 4, at 209-10 ("In the research files of Nexis .... there are 220
newspaper and magazine stories that have mentioned 'tortious interference' since CBS News made
the decision not to allow the Wigand segment to go on the air.").
6. See Margaret A. Jacobs, Will Promises of Silence Pass Tests in Court?, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 14, 1995, at B1. This article is the only one found that directly addresses the issue of
whistleblowers who have been sued for violating confidentiality agreements.
7. See Alois Valerian Gross, Annotation, What Is "TradeSecret" So As to RenderActionable
Under State Law Its Use or Disclosureby Former Employee, 59 A.L.R.4TH 641, 657 (1988)
(observing, in a broad overview of trade secret cases, that the existence of employee confidentiality agreements has been an important factor in influencing the assignment of "trade secret" status

to disclosed information).
8. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Wigand, No. 95-CI-06560 (Ky. Ct. App. filed
Nov. 21, 1995). As part of the landmark tobacco settlement that was reached in June of this year,
Brown & Williamson, under pressure from state attorneys general, agreed to dismiss its lawsuit
against Wigand. Under the terms of the settlement agreement, Wigand is released from liability
for all actions taken prior to the date of the settlement, but remains bound by his confidentiality
agreements until March 20 of next year or until settlement legislation is passed by Congress. See
Kim Wessel, B&WDismissesLawsuitAgainst Wigand, THE COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.),
Aug. 1, 1997, at 3B. As of the date that this article was submitted for publication, Congress had
not yet approved the tobacco settlement.
9. No published opinions directly on point were found, a result that is consistent with another
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may be forced to do so to resolve cases similar to the Wigand case that are
currently pending and likely to follow.1" The approach courts take in

resolving such confidentiality agreement cases will determine whether
employers gain a powerful, new weapon to silence whistleblowers. Current
protections for employee whistleblowers" address wrongful discharge or
other discriminatory treatment by one's employer, not contractual liability.
Exposure to unknown amounts of contractual liability imposes an additional
(and arguably even stronger) deterrent to speaking out than the fear of being
fired'-to the detriment of an informed debate on matters of public importance. 13
This article argues that a purely contractual approach is not adequate to
address the enforceability of employee confidentiality agreements against
whistleblowers. To the extent that the enforcement of employee confidentiality
agreements restricts the vibrancy of public debate, the First Amendment
should provide additional protection beyond that afforded by contract law. The
First Amendment is implicated because court enforcement of contract law
constitutes state action. 4 Like other areas of common law, contract law must
accommodate the demands of the First Amendment when state enforcement
threatens public discourse.' 5
Of course, in a given case a court could legitimately refuse to enforce an
employee confidentiality agreement within the parameters of contract law
itself, without explicitly integrating the First Amendment into the analysis, by
arguing that the public interest in disclosure is sufficiently great to render the

study which noted that, despite the potential for contractual liability, "cases where an employer
has sued [a whistleblower] under a confidentiality clause remain unreported." Stefan Riitzel,
Snitchingfor the Common Good: In Search of a Response to the Legal Problems Posed by
Environmental Whistleblowing, 14 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 1, 16 (1995).
10. See Jacobs, supra note 6, at B5 (citing pending cases in which whistleblowers have been
sued for violating confidentiality agreements and noting that this novel issue is one with which
courts will have to struggle).
11. See generally DANIEL P. WESTMAN, WHISTLEBLOWING: THE LAW OF RETALIATORY
DISCHARGE (1991) (discussing various statutory and common-law forms of whistleblower
protection).
12. See Ritzel, supra note 9, at 26.
13. Commentators have recently highlighted the threat of confidentiality agreements to debate
on matters of public importance in a different context-the funding of scientific research. See
Ralph T. King Jr., Bitter Pill: How a Drug Firm Paidfor University Study, Then Undermined
It, WALL ST. J., Apr. 25, 1996, at Al.
14. See discussion infra Part II.
15. Cf. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988) (intentional infliction of
emotional distress); Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 777 (1986)
(defamation); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 489-91 (1975) (public disclosure of
private facts); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388-89 (1967) (false-light invasion of privacy);
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964) (defamation).
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contract void as against public policy.' 6 However, this article challenges a
court's willingness to enforce the contract without accounting for the First
Amendment consequences. Recognizing the First Amendment implications of
enforcing employee confidentiality agreements is constitutionally required and
is also likely to provide greater protection for whistleblowers than contract law
alone.
While a purely contractual approach would begin with a strong
presumption of enforceability, to be overcome only by the unpredictable
application of the public policy exception," a First Amendment defense
would require a more rigorous showing that enforcement of the contract is
necessary to further state interests substantial enough to justify the restrictions
placed on speech.'" To the extent that courts look to state statutes and
common law as sources of public policy, wide disparities will exist in the
ability of whistleblowers to avail themselves of a public policy defense to
contract enforcement because the protections afforded whistleblowers vary
greatly from state to state.' 9 Introducing the First Amendment into the
analysis, where it properly belongs, would ideally promote more even-handed
protection.
Even if court enforcement of employee vows of silence raises a First

Amendment issue, one might argue that employees arguably may have waived
their rights to assert a First Amendment defense by signing confidentiality
agreements. Part III of this article explains why such an argument fails. Many
cases involving whistleblowers who have signed confidentiality agreements
arguably fail to fulfill the requirement that waivers of constitutional rights be
"knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.'"2 Even if these formal requirements
are met, courts must balance the interests for and against enforcement of

16. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§ 178(1)

(1981).

17. See 2 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 5.1, at 2 (1990).
18. See infra text accompanying notes 95-97.
19. See generally WESTMAN, supra note 11, at 61-117 (discussing state statutory and
common-law protections for employees in the private sector). Recognizing that the enforcement
of confidentiality agreements against whistleblowers is a First Amendment issue also opens up
the possibility of Supreme Court review, cf. Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.)
590, 609-10 (1874) (holding that the Supreme Court may review federal, but not state, questions
decided in state court), which in turn guarantees a constitutional floor below which protection
cannot fall. Of course, state courts often interpret the scope of constitutional liberties more, rather
than less, broadly than the Supreme Court, a phenomenon that has received much attention in
recent decades and that is reflected in the outcome of a case discussed below, Cohen v. Cowles
Media Co. See infra Part IV.A. Compare Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669-72
(1991) (holding that the First Amendment provides no defense to a promissory estoppel claim
based on a violation of a confidentiality agreement by a newspaper reporter), with Cohen v.
Cowles Media Co., 457 N.W.2d 199,205 (Minn. 1990) (granting the First Amendment defense).
20. See infra Part III.A.
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waivers of constitutional rights.2 The First Amendment interests at stake
therefore cannot be ignored by arguing that they have been waived, but must
be accounted for before the validity of the waiver can be determined. Finally,
the very notion of waiving First Amendment rights is problematic when the
speech at issue affects public discourse, an imperative beyond the power of
any individual to bargain away.'
Having argued that "waiver" may not foreclose First Amendment
scrutiny, Part IV then performs this scrutiny, weighing the First Amendment
interests in disclosure against the state interests in confidentiality, and
concluding that the First Amendment interests are superior as a general
matter.' This conclusion must necessarily be a general one because the
substantiality of the interests at stake will vary depending on the circumstances
of a given case. As such, Part IV identifies some of the factors that should be
relevant to the outcome of a particular case, and others that should not.24
Finally, Part V analyzes three modem Supreme Court cases that could
be cited in favor of the enforceability of confidentiality agreements against
disclosures in the public interest: Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.,25 Seattle
Times Co. v. Rhinehart,26 and Snepp v. United States.27 These cases, each
distinguishable in crucial ways from the context of employee whistleblowing,
provide little support for silencing employees who wish to speak out on
matters of public concern.
II. STATE ACTION
Although employee confidentiality agreements involve private parties and
the constraints imposed by the First Amendment apply only to government
actions, private agreements still can raise a First Amendment question because
court enforcement of private contracts is subject to constitutional scrutiny. When a court applies common-law rules to a private dispute, the state
intervenes authoritatively to regulate conduct-just as if it had done so
legislatively. 2" Therefore, the application of common law by state courts
constitutes state action.29

21.
22.
23.
24.

See
See
See
See

infra Part III.B.
infra Part III.C.
infra Part IV.A.B.
infra Part IV.C.

25. 501 U.S. 663 (1991).

26. 467 U.S. 20 (1984).
27. 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (per curiam).
28. See Henry C. Strickland, The State Action Doctrine and the Rehnquist Court, 18
L.Q. 587, 599-600 (1991).

HASTINGS CONST.

29. See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 916 n.51 (1982)
("Although this is a civil lawsuit between private parties, the application of state rules of law by
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The Court in New York Times Co. v. Sulliva? ° readily concluded
that the application of libel law by Alabama state courts was a form of state
action;31 and in subsequent cases involving the application of common-law
rules, the Court has either presumed the existence of state action 32 or has
found state action to be present without much elaboration. 33 In none of these
cases did any of the Justices dissent on the finding of state action. As
Professor Tribe has stated: "The general proposition that common law is state
action-that is, that the state 'acts' when its courts create and enforce common
34
law rules-is hardly controversial."
Perhaps more controversial is whether this proposition applies to contract
law in particular. The argument that the application of contract law would not
qualify as state action, even if the application of other areas of common law
does, is that while other regimes of law embody the substantive policies of the
state, contract law merely establishes the ground rules for private bargaining
which the state then neutrally applies.3'
However, such an argument is not ultimately persuasive. In applying
contract law, courts do not merely ratify private preferences. Instead, courts
decide which choices the state will sanction, 36 employee confidentiality
agreements being a perfect example of such a decision, and how the terms of
the bargain should be construed when the intent of the parties is unclear.37
Just as it has come to be accepted that the principles of contract and tort, once
thought to be such separate and discrete areas of law, tend to converge, overly

the Mississippi state courts in a manner alleged to restrict First Amendment freedoms constitutes
'state action' under the Fourteenth Amendment." (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376

U.S. 254,

265 (1964))); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 18-1,
at 1688-89 (2d ed. 1988) ("[The rule of decision expressly invoked or necessarily relied upon

by a state's highest court-either to grant relief against one party or to deny the relief sought by
another party-constitutes 'state action' reviewable on the merits by the Supreme Court.");
Strickland, supra note 28, at 606 ("Under current doctrine,. . . substantive civil law and its
judicial enforcement are state action subject to the Fourteenth Amendment like any other law.").
30. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
31. See id. at 265.
32. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988).
33. See, e.g., Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 668 (1991); Philadelphia
Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 777 (1986).
34. TRIBE, supra note 29, § 18-6, at 1711.
35. See Paul Brest, State Action and Liberal Theory: A Casenote on Flagg Brothers v.
Brooks, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1296, 1323 (1982) (discussing, but not accepting, this argument).
36. Cf. 1, 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 17, chs. 4-5 (discussing when courts will refuse to
enforce contracts on grounds of unconscionability or public policy).
37. See id. § 7.15-.17. Disputes over the intent of the parties can be expected to arise when
courts are asked to enforce employee confidentiality agreements against whistleblowers, given the
likelihood of disagreement as to the type of disclosures anticipated by such agreements. Cf. infra
Part III.A (noting the fact that employees' intent in signing confidentiality agreements may often
be unclear).
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sharp lines cannot be drawn between them for purposes of state action."

More basically, we have understood, at least since the time of the Legal
Realists, that even the background principles of contract law, like other forms
of common law, necessarily reflect the positive choices of the state and
that the state can never claim to have left private choices entirely unimpaired

by enforcing contracts in an apparently "neutral" fashion. 9

In Shelley v. Kraemer ° the Supreme Court recognized that court
enforcement of private contracts-in particular, racially restrictive covenants-constitutes state action.41 However, as is well known, the Supreme
Court rarely cites Shelley,42 and commentators refer to it "as one of the most
controversial and problematical decisions in all of constitutional law."'
The problem with Shelley is not its holding that court enforcement of
common law, or of contract law in particular, constitutes state action; that
position is proper and should be considered good law.' Rather, the problem
is that the Court never explained why judicial enforcement of the contract
violated the Equal Protection Clause.45 While enforcement of racially
restrictive covenants by Missouri courts clearly amounts to state action,
whether this enforcement is at odds with the requirement of state neutrality
under the Equal Protection Clause is uncertain.46 Indeed, the Court never
explicitly addressed the issue. By failing to articulate clearly the distinction
between the arguably neutral enforcement of the covenant47 and the discriminatory private action of entering into the covenant, the Shelley Court suggested
that the initial private action could be subjected to constitutional scrutiny based

38. TRIE, supra note 29, § 18-6, at 1713-14.
39. Compare CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONsTITUTION 159 (1993), stating that
[t]he lesson of the [Legal Realist] attack on status quo neutrality is
emphatically not that there is no line between public and private
action, or that private action is constitutionally restricted. The lesson
is that the law of contract, tort, and property is just that-law. It
should be assessed in the same way in which other law is assessed.
40. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
41. See id. at 13-19.
42. See Strickland, supra note 28, at 606.

43.

GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

1617 (2d ed. 1991).

44. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 39, at 160 ("Shelley v. Kraemer... was a remarkably easy
state action case. How could the government's enforcement of a racially restrictive covenant,
through its courts, be anything but state action?").
45. See id. (stating "[t]he case was difficult only because it is unclear whether the
Constitution forbids the state's apparently neutral use of its courts to enforce contracts").
46. See TRIBE, supra note 29, § 18-6, at 1713-15.
47. Although the Court never explicitly argued that Missouri failed to enforce restrictive
covenants neutrally with respect to race, some commentators have. See Strickland, supra note 28,
at 604 n.87 (quoting LAURENCE H. TRIE, Refocusing the "State Action" Inquiry: Separating
State Acts from State Actors, in CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 260 (1985)).
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on the mere prospect of court ratification.48
However, even if the potential for court enforcement of private
agreements does not transform private actors into state actors subject to
constitutional standards, as Shelley seemed to suggest, the enforcement of
private agreements by state courts is still state action that must satisfy
Fourteenth Amendment scrutiny.49 Whereas race-neutral application of
contract law would ordinarily survive such scrutiny when the constitutional
provision at issue is the Equal Protection Clause, 50 which is concerned with
differential treatment by the state, even neutral enforcement of contracts to the
detriment of public debate offends the First Amendment.5 Although contentneutral restrictions of speech are not scrutinized as closely as content-based
restrictions, they are still not free from constitutional exactitude. 52
The case that appears on the surface to pose the greatest challenge to the
"application of common law" branch of the state action doctrine is Hudgens
v. NLRB,53 which found that the First Amendment had no relevance to a
private shopping center's exclusion of picketers from its property by
threatening a trespass prosecution. 54 Hudgens, however, did not reject the

proposition that a trespass prosecution55 would have constituted state action,
but indeed failed to address this potential source of state action at all.

The predecessors to Hudgens-Marsh v. Alabamd 6 and Amalgamated
Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.5 -held
that the First Amendment prohibited using state trespass law to exclude
speakers from privately held property which for all practical purposes

48. See id. at 603-05.
49. See supranotes 29-35; see also SUNSTEIN, supra note 39, at 160-61 (shifting state action
analysis to "real issue" of whether a constitutional provision is violated).
50. Cf. SUNSTEIN, supra note 39, at 161 ("Mhe enforcement of a contract and the
availability of contract law are state action; but usually contract law does not offend the
Constitution.").
51. See infra text accompanying notes 101-109.
52. See infra text accompanying notes 101-103.
53. 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
54. See id. at 520-21.
55. See id. at 508 (the prosecutionwas only threatened). A similar procedural posture existed
in Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978). FlaggBros. held that a private warehouseman's
threatened sale of bailed goods pursuant to a New York commercial code provision, codifying
the common-law right of self-help repossession, was not subject to due process scrutiny. ThenJustice Rehnquist noted, however, that "[t]here is no reason ... to believe that either Flagg
Brothers or respondents could not ... seek resort to the New York courts in order to [obtain
relief]." Id. at 161 n.11. Presumably, had Ms. Brooks brought an action challenging the
provision and been denied relief by the New York courts, that decision itself, whatever its
constitutional merits, would at least have been constitutionally contestable. See TRIBE, supra
note 29, § 18-6, at 1712-13.
56. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
57. 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
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constituted public fora.58 The "publicness" of the forum may have been
crucial to the outcome of First Amendment scrutiny, at least in Logan Valley,
but what triggered scrutiny in the first place was the common-law cause of
action. 9 Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner 0° challenged Logan Valley's characterization
of the massive modem-day shopping center as a public forum;6 and Hudgens,viewing the two cases as irreconcilable, adopted the position of Lloyd as stare
decisis. 62 While Hudgens adopted Lloyd's position that shopping centers are
private fora and therefore undeserving of First Amendment protection, it never
rejected or even addressed the fact that a state trespass prosecution at least
provides the basis for a First Amendment challenge. 63 Under Hudgens's view
of shopping center property, such a challenge would be unsuccessful; but this
outcome only reflects the Court's First Amendment public-forum jurisprudence-not its rejection of the principle that court enforcement of common-law
regimes constitutes state action.
To the contrary, a 1991 study of the Rehnquist Court's treatment of the
state action doctrine concluded that all members of the Court at the time
considered judicial application of common-law rules to constitute state
action.' This conclusion was confirmed by Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.,'
which is of special relevance because it involved a confidentiality agreement
(albeit not an employee confidentiality agreement). While the state court of
appeals found no state action in the trial court's enforcement of the contract
(resting on a perceived distinction for state action purposes between the
enforcement of contract and tort law),6 the United States Supreme Court was

58. Logan Valley, 391 U.S. at 319-20; Marsh, 326 U.S. at 507-09.
59. TRIBE, supra note 29, § 18-5, at 1708-09.
60. 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
61. Id. at 568-69. Although cryptically noting that the First and Fourteenth Amendments
place limits only on the state and not private property owners, see id. at 567, the Lloyd Corp.

Court never doubted the presence of state action. While the Fourteenth Amendment clearly does
not directly limit private actors, the authorization of private action by state law is state action.
See supra text accompanying notes 40-44.
62. Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 519-21.
63.
The "functional equivalence" test [of Lloyd and Logan Valley] determined only
whether particular property was private or public for a particular purpose as a
matter of constitutional law. If the Hudgens Court had framed the question as
Marsh originally did, the issue would have been whether a state, in choosing to
enforce what it deemed private property rights, denied some individuals free speech
rights without adequate justification. The relevant inquiry would not have been
whether the property was public or private, but whether state-protected freedom of
speech in the shopping center context was required in order to secure first
amendment values.
TRIBE, supra note 29, § 18-5, at 1710-11.
64. See Strickland, supra note 28, at 645.
65. 501 U.S. 663, 668 (1991). See infra Part V.A.
66. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 445 N.W.2d 248, 255-56 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
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unanimous in holding that:
The rationale of our decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and
subsequent cases compels the conclusion that there is state action here.

Our cases teach that the application of state rules of law in state courts
in a manner alleged to restrict First Amendment freedoms constitutes
"state action" under the Fourteenth Amendment. 67

The Court has been clear, in short, that the application of common law
by state courts is state action, and neither principle nor precedent suggests an
exception for contract law. Court enforcement of employee confidentiality
agreements against disclosures made in the public interest, therefore, must
satisfy the demands of the First Amendment.
II.

WAIVER

One might argue that even if state action is present in court enforcement
of employee confidentiality agreements, the First Amendment presents no
obstacle because the employees have waived their First Amendment rights.6 1
This part of the article explains why such an argument fails.
A.

FormalRequirements

Constitutional rights may be waived only if the waiver is voluntary,
knowing, and intelligent. 69 Although the precise requisites of this standard

67. Cohen, 501 U.S. at 668 (citations omitted). Neither of the two dissents objected to the
state action finding.
The state supreme court in Cohen decided that a valid contract had not been formed and
that the case should be analyzed under the principles of promissory estoppel. See Cohen v.
Cowles Media Co., 457 N.W.2d 199, 203-05 (Minn. 1990). Although noting that promissory
estoppel is "a state-law doctrine which, in the absence of a contract, creates obligations never
explicitly assumed by the parties," Cohen, 501 U.S. at 668, the United States Supreme Court
seems to have made this observation more by way of defining the issue before it than through an
effort to distinguish promissory estoppel from traditional contract law. Certainly no such express
distinction was drawn, which is revealing given the decision by the state court of appeals. Nor
would such a distinction be persuasive. See supra text accompanying notes 36-39.
68. Cf. Erie Telecomms., Inc. v. City of Erie, 853 F.2d 1084, 1101 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding
that a valid contractual waiver barred a First Amendment claim).
69. See, e.g., D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 185-86 (1972) (finding rights
waived where the party is sophisticated and the release is not an adhesion contract); Davies v.
Grossmont Union High Sch. Dist., 930 F.2d 1390, 1394-95 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating the same
standard but requiring a fuller development of the facts before reaching a conclusion); Erie, 853
F.2d at 1095-96 (discussing Supreme Court jurisprudence on waiver of constitutional rights).
When First Amendment rights are at issue, waiver will not be found "in circumstances which fall
short of being clear and compelling." Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 145 (1967).
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have not been established,7" the general requirement is that "the facts and
circumstances surrounding the waiver make it clear that the party foregoing
its rights has done so of its own volition, with full understanding of the
consequences of its waiver."7" Among the relevant facts to consider in
making the determination are "the language of the purported waiver, the
sophistication of the parties, the balance of bargaining power, and whether the
parties received advice from counsel."'72
While circumstances will vary from case to case, conceivably employees'
waiver of their rights to disclose some kinds of confidential information will
often fail to satisfy this "voluntary, knowing, and intelligent" standard.
Because "confidentiality agreements are [often] phrased in general terms"
forbidding the disclosure of all confidential information, 73 employees may not
understand that the agreement covers not only traditional trade secrets, but
disclosures of employer malfeasance affecting the public interest.7' Presumably, representation by counsel or even individualized discussion of terms
would be rare. Disparities in sophistication and bargaining power between
employer and employee might also be at issue in some cases.
An argument about disparities in bargaining power, in fact, need not rely
on often dubious notions of the employee's relative unsophistication or of his
being at the mercy of the employer offering him a job. The stronger argument
concerns the information asymmetries between employer and employee when
the bargain over confidentiality is struck. While the employer ordinarily knows
what information needs or might need to be kept secret, the employee lacks
the information required to value the speech rights being relinquished.75 At
the time of contracting, the employee has no idea what activities the employer
is engaged in that might later compel the employee to divulge confidential
information and should not be expected to enter the agreement under a
presumption that the employer is hiding information important to the public's
well-being.
Admittedly, the "voluntary, knowing, and intelligent" standard seems to

70. Erie, 853 F.2d at 1095 ("While the Supreme Court has never defined precisely what
constitutes a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver, the Court has stated that whether a

constitutional right has been waived depends in each case upon the particular facts and
circumstances surrounding that case .... ").
71. Id. at 1096.
72. Ruzicka v. Conde Nast Publications, 733 F. Supp. 1289, 1297 (D. Minn. 1990).
73. Rftzel, supra note 9, at 25.
74. Cf. id. (stating employees do not usually anticipate confidentiality agreements to apply
to their employer's illegal behavior). Additionally, in choosing between various interpretations
of the agreement, any ambiguity would be construed against the drafter and would require the
public interest to be considered. See id.
75. Even if the employee were able to price accurately the personal value of foregone speech,
this private valuation would underestimate its total social value. The notion that speech rights are
public goods which resist bargaining paradigms is discussed infra note 89.
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be more concerned with parties' actual and uncoerced awareness that they are
relinquishing a valuable right, rather than with the importance the right
ultimately assumes to the parties as circumstances change. Unquestion-

ably, "[ilt is possible to knowingly waive a general right without contemplat76
ing the specific circumstances under which that waiver will be enforced.
However, a genuinely intelligent waiver should require not merely an

understanding that one is waiving a certain right, but some substantial ability
to measure the true implications of doing so. Recognizing that the primary
justification for permitting rights to be waived is an interest in preserving

individual autonomy,' a legitimate waiver must bear some strong relationship
to what one would do if possessed of all relevant information.
B.

Substantive Enforceability

Even if the formal requirements for waiver are met, a court must decide
whether the waiver is substantively enforceable. The standard for answering
this question when the rights being waived are guaranteed by federal law was
established in Town of Newton v. Rumery. 78 In Rumery the Supreme Court,
relying on the traditional common-law principle that contracts are void when
contrary to public policy, found that a waiver of federal rights "is unenforceable if the interest in its enforcement is outweighed . . . by a public policy
harmed by enforcement. "9
Therefore, First Amendment interests that would be harmed by
enforcement of a confidentiality agreement may not be ignored simply by
asserting that they have been waived. Instead, those interests must be taken
into account initially to determine whether the waiver is enforceable at all."o
/

76. Davies v. Grossmont Union High Sch. Dist., 930 F.2d 1390, 1395 (9th Cir. 1991).

77. See Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a
Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 1293, 1384 (1984).
78. 480 U.S. 386 (1987).
79. Id. at 392. One circuit, in a case involving the waiver of First Amendment rights, has
refused to apply the Rumery balancing test, arguing "that the 'knowing, voluntary and intelligent'
standard established by the Supreme Court for the waiver of constitutional rights, subsumes
consideration of the public's interests." Erie Telecomms., Inc. v. City of Erie, 853 F.2d 1084,
1099 (3d Cir. 1988). How the public's interest in the First Amendment rights at issue in Erie is
subsumed by the formal requirements of waiver is hard to imagine, as is how Erie can be squared
with the Supreme Court's requirement of a separate public-interest balancing test. If anything,
one would assume that the waiver of constitutional rights, and especially First Amendment rights,
would deserve more careful scrutiny than the waiver of the statutory rights at issue in Rumery.
SeeDavies, 930 F.2d at 1397 (noting that a waiver of constitutionalrights might require a stricter
standard than Rumery). But see Leonard v. Clark, 12 F.3d 885, 890-91 & n.8 (9th Cir. 1993)
(applying Rumery to waiver of constitutional rights but declining Davies's invitation to apply a
stricter standard). Erie did little to justify this departure from Rumery other than to
note summarily that the facts of Rumery were different. See Erie, 853 F.2d at 1099-1100.
80. In some cases, statutes that have expressly identified a public policy of protecting
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In effect, the contractual analysis of the waiver collapses with the balancing
of interests required by the First Amendmentl-although the result of this
contractual analysis remains subject to First Amendment scrutiny to the extent
that it fails to protect speech adequately.
One might respond that the First Amendment is not a cognizable public
policy interest in determining whether to enforce a waiver of speech rights
because the First Amendment protects only against infringements by the
government. Some courts have in fact approved of this argument in wrongful
discharge cases, refusing to recognize the First Amendment as grounds for a
public policy exception to employment-at-will.Y
This argument fails to account for the doctrine described in Part
H-that court application of common law is itself state action. Courts that have
considered the First Amendment to be irrelevant to the availability of wrongful
discharge actions have failed to appreciate that in determining which speech
deprivations will be sanctioned by state law, the court itself provided the state
action required to activate the First Amendment.83 The availability vel non

particular types of speech may make a contractual waiver unenforceable, thereby rendering
recourse to the First Amendment unnecessary. See, e.g., United States v. Northrop Corp., 59
F.3d 953, 963-65 (9th Cir. 1995) (refusing to enforce employee's release of claims against the
corporation because barring the initiation of a qui tam action is contrary to Congress's intent to
encourage whistleblowing). However, the First Amendment not only provides protection in the
absence of relevant statutes, but also may buttress policy arguments in cases where some statutory
ammunition is also available.
81. See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 457 N.W.2d 199, 205 (Minn. 1990) ("In deciding
whether it would be unjust not to enforce the promise, the court must necessarily weigh the same
considerations that are weighed for whether the First Amendment has been violated."); see also
infra text accompanying notes 95-97 (stating that content-neutral restrictions of speech require
balancing of interests).
82. See, e.g., Shovelinv. Central N.M. Elec. Coop., 850 P.2d 996, 1009-10 (N.M. 1993)
(refusing to recognize the right to political expression as public policy); Barr v. Kelso-Burnett
Co., 478 N.E.2d 1354, 1356-57 (Ili. 1985) (observing that the First Amendment is irrelevant to
the relationship between private employers and employees). But see Novosel v. Nationwide Ins.
Co., 721 F.2d 894, 900 (3d Cir. 1983) (accepting the First Amendment as the basis for a
wrongful discharge action). Paul v. Lankenau Hosp., 569 A.2d 346, 348 (Pa. 1990), rejected
Novosel as an interpretation of Pennsylvania law, and the Novosel position remains the minority
view.
83. Cf. Lisa B. Bingham, Employee Free Speech in the Workplace: Using the First
Amendment as Public Policy for Wrongful DischargeActions, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 341, 362-72
(1994) (questioning the constitutionality of granting wrongful discharge remedies based on
specified types of employee speech without extending this remedy to political speech). While
correct to view the denial of wrongful discharge claims as state action, Bingham's analysis errs

in assuming that the state only "acts" for First Amendment purposes when it fails to be neutral
in restricting speech. See supra text accompanying notes 49-51. Content-neutral actions by the
state, if subject to lower scrutiny, still activate the First Amendment when they impair speech. In
sum, the First Amendment is implicated by all publicly important employee speech restricted by
the state, not just expressions of employees' political sympathies.
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of state tort remedies to determine the degree to which a private party may
exact penalties from another for speaking on a matter of public concern
implicates the First Amendment in wrongful discharge cases as surely as it did
in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. ' Similarly, when a court determines
whether the state will recognize a contract that restricts speech on matters of
public importance, the First Amendment implications of that choice must be
assessed.85 Whether the First Amendment interests are invoked as a policy
basis for challenging enforcement within the framework of contract law, or on
their own terms in the form of a First Amendment defense, they must be given
their due consideration.

C. The Problem of Waiving FirstAmendment Rights
The very notion of waiving First Amendment rights is problematic

when the speech involves matters of public concern. Apart from the fact
that arguing waiver does not prevent First Amendment interests from being
considered, waiver is a conclusion that may be reached only after the court
considers those interests. The First Amendment protects not only the
individual speaker, but also the marketplace of ideas and the public's interest
in collective self-determination.s Accordingly, individuals' rights to speak

84. Possible grounds for distinction exist, but they are unconvincing. For instance,
arguably the state has acted when it provides certain common-law remedies, but not when it
refuses to provide such remedies and leaves the parties to their own devices. The problem with
this argument is that regardless of how the constitutional implications of these two types of state
choices may differ (and the degree to which they differ has been the subject of much debate, see
Strickland, supranote 28, at 608-12), they both are state choices. See id. at 606-17. In any case,
the argument does not apply to the issue of employee confidentiality agreements where state
action comes in the form of courts granting a remedy otherwise unavailable to the employer,
namely the enforcement of contracts.
85. Of course, the calculus will not be quite the same as for the related wrongful discharge
issue, and none of this analysis on the enforcement of employee confidentiality contracts requires
any necessary conclusion about the First Amendment merits of the wrongful discharge issue. For
example, the First Amendment harms of denying a wrongful discharge action arguably may not
be as serious as enforcing a confidentiality agreement. While the former allows the employee to
be fired from a particular job for speaking out, the latter exposes the employee to an unknown
amount of liability and is therefore likely to chill speech more severely. The state's interest in
refusing to force employers to continue to employ workers against the employer's wishes,
similarly, is different from, and arguably stronger than, its interest in enforcing confidentiality
agreements. The factors relevant to the outcome of a given wrongful discharge case would also
differ from those relevant here. See infra Part IV.C.
86. The classic presentation of this aspect of the First Amendment is ALEXANDER
MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT

(1948). For other

treatments of the issue by some of its prominent exponents, see OWEN M. FISS, LIBERALISM
DIVIDED: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE MANY USES OF STATE POWER (1996) and Harry
Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the First
Amendment, ' 1964 Sup. CT. REV. 191.
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on matters of public concern are never solely theirs to bargain away."
Without becoming embroiled in the debate over the central function of the
First Amendment,"8 in some large measure, it indisputably is not merely
about protecting self-expression-an interest that fits neatly into a paradigm of
individual choice; but it also is about the vibrancy of public debate-an interest
that does not.89
A strong body of precedent does not exist to indicate the degree to which
courts will accept the waiver of First Amendment rights even if the formal
requirements of waiver are met.' Some circuit courts have upheld the

87. See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 677-78 (1991) (Souter, I., dissenting);
see also G. Richard Shell, Contractsin the Modem Supreme Court, 81 CAL. L. REV. 433, 516
(1993) ("[R]ights to free speech and a free press are arguably so fundamental to the functioning
of a democratic society that they ought not to be subjected to unregulated market ordering backed
by the state power of contractenforcement."). Compare Kreimer, supranote 77, at 1387, stating:
The case for recognition of waivers rests on the conviction that constitutional rights
protect individual choice. But many constitutional rights protect other values or
protect individual choice only as a means to the realization of other ends. For such
rights, there is no paradox in asserting that the choice of the individual should not
decide the applicability of the right in question.
88. See Fiss, supra note 86, at 5-6 (discussing conflict between competing First Amendment
camps, one stressing expressive autonomy and the other the richness of public debate).
89. Even if we accepted the applicability of the bargaining paradigm to employee whistleblowing, there are factors internal to the bargain that might cause us to reject the unchecked
alienability of speech rights. Namely, information about how an employer's activities affect the
public is a public good, or a good whose value cannot be fully internalized by the purchaser (in
this case, the employee who signs a confidentiality agreement), and which is therefore not
produced in a quantity that accurately represents the public's demand. See generally Daniel A.
Farber, Free Speech Without Romance: Public Choice and the FirstAmendment, 105 HARv. L.
REV. 554 (1991) (analyzing First Amendmentjurisprudence from the perspectiveof public choice
theory). As with other public goods, such as clean air or national defense, additional efforts (the
approach taken here being one) may be necessary to produce employee speech in a quantity
greater than the market level. Cf. Cynthia L. Estlund, Free Speech and Due Process in the
Workplace, 71 IND. L.J. 101, 111-12 (1995) (noting the need to protect employee speech in order
to increase employee production of information).
90. See Norman M. Sinel et al., RecentDevelopments in CableLaw, in 1 CABLE TELEVISION
LAW 1995: COPING wrrH COMPETITION AND REGULATION 9, 110 (1995) (noting that "[w]hile
the doctrine of waiver of constitutional rights is not new, it has rarely been applied in the context
of the First Amendment").
One writer relied on Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980), Cohen, 501 U.S. 663,
and Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991), to argue that the Court has broadly sanctioned the
waiver of First Amendment rights. G. Michael Harvey, Confidentiality:A MeasuredResponse
to the Failureof Privacy, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 2385, 2450-60 (1992). These cases simply do not
support such a reading. Snepp did not hold that First Amendment rights had been waived. See
infra note 206. To the extent that it addressed contractual issues at all, Snepp is more consistent
with the contrary position (expressly taken by the Fourth Circuit in Snepp, 595 F.2d 926, 935
(4th Cir. 1979)) that the mere existence of a contract does not bar the assertion of First
Amendment rights. See infra text accompanying notes 205-09. Cohen's treatment of waiver is
problematic-in fact the Court never directly addressed the issue-but its refusal to apply any
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contractual waiver of First Amendment rights in a few instances, 9' but
notably, the restrictions of speech in these cases were perceived to be more in
the nature of commercial limitations amenable to the give and take of the
bargaining process, rather than genuine restrictions upon the public store of
information.' In other cases, courts have expressly disapproved of the notion
of waiving First Amendment rights. 3
If precedent on the issue is slim, the intuition that individuals ordinarily
may not bargain away their rights to speak at the expense of the public is
powerful. However, we need not and may not rely on intuition because First
Amendment jurisprudence prescribes the proper inquiry-namely, whether the
state interests supporting a particular bargain outweigh the threat posed to

scrutiny to a contract restricting freedom of speech was not grounded upon waiver of that right.
See infra text accompanying notes 170-79. Finally, Rust was framed as a question of the
conditions the government may place upon its expenditures and never held that doctors who
received such funds had thereby waived their right to speak. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 196-200.
91. See Leonard v. Clark, 12 F.3d 885, 889-92 (9th Cir. 1993); American Fed'n of Gov't
Employees Local 3884 v. FLRA, 930 F.2d 1315, 1327-28 (8th Cir. 1991); Erie Telecomms.,
Inc. v. City of Erie, 853 F.2d 1084, 1096-97 (3d Cir. 1988).
92. See Leonard, 12 F.3d at 891-92; Local 3884, 930 F.2d at 1328; Erie, 853 F.2d at 108990. Leonard, for example, concerned a provision in a firefighters' union contract offsetting
against current salaries any future legislative increases in wages or benefits endorsed by the
union. While this provision indirectly impeded the union's right to petition the government, it
only restricted lobbying for payroll-increasing legislation. The court noted that if the provision
amounted to a broader ban on union speech, "we might well hold that the public interest in
allowing and hearing such speech outweighs the public interests in enforcing the waiver."
Leonard, 12 F.3d at 891.
93. See United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1317 (4th Cir. 1972) ("Marchetti...
by signing a secrecy agreement did not surrender his First Amendment right of free speech. The
agreement is enforceable only because it is not a violation of those rights."); cf. Davies v.
Grossmont Union High Sch. Dist., 930 F.2d 1390, 1397 (9th Cir. 1991) (emphasizing the
distinction between waiving private rights and waiving rights affecting the public in refusing to
enforce the latter).
In Karetnikovav. Trustees ofEmerson College, 725 F. Supp. 73, 80-81 (D. Mass. 1989),
the court held that a professor's claim that she had been denied tenure based on her expression
of political beliefs did not depend on an interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement and
was therefore not preempted by § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act because
freedom from interference with speech does not necessarily depend
upon the expectations and agreed-upon arrangements between the
employer and employee.. ..
...Mhe conditions or restrictions which may be placed
on ...speech as conditions of employment are also of concern to
society as a whole, and may properly be determined... not by
reference to the agreement of the parties, but in light of the values of
safeguarding robust speech in the marketplace generally.
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public discourse.' The next part of this article asks this question in the
context of employee confidentiality agreements.
IV. FIRST AMENDMENT BALANCING
A.

FirstAmendment Interests

Content-neutral restrictions on speech, such as the enforcement of
confidentiality agreements against disclosures on matters of public concern, 95
are permissible only if the state interests supporting the restriction are
substantial enough to outweigh the resulting burdens upon First Amendment

rights. The burden also must be no greater than necessary to effectuate the
state interests.96 In applying this balancing test, "the first amendment...
requires a 'thumb' on the scale to assure that the balance struck in any
particular situation properly reflects the central position of free expression in
the constitutional scheme."' When employee confidentiality agreements are
so weighed, the balance generally should tip in favor of the First Amendment.
The Supreme Court "has frequently reaffirmed that speech on public
issues occupies the '"highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment
values."'""8 Given the essential role employee whisfleblowing can play in

94. See infra Part IV.
95. At first glance this restriction may not appear to be content-neutral at all, but rather to
depend on the content of the information disclosed by the whisfleblower. However, this initial
reaction merely reflects the imprecision of the term "content-neutral" to demarcate the proper
level of scrutiny. Courts make content distinctions frequently in First Amendment jurisprudence,
but the type of content-regulation against which strict scrutiny is genuinely aimed involves
government hostility toward a particular message. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377,
430-31 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring); Fiss, supra note 86, at 81. See generally Geoffrey R.
Stone, Content Regulation and the FirstAmendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189, 233-51
(1983) (exploring the often ambiguous line between content-neutral and viewpoint-based
restrictions).
However, while enforcing employee confidentiality agreements does not target a particular
message, the First Amendment should be particularly wary of this restriction because
whistleblowing is a politically charged act, the very performance of which expresses a message
about which people have strong, opposing reactions. See, e.g., MARCIA P. MICELI & JANET P.
NEAR, BLOWING THE WHISTLE 1 (1992).
96. See, e.g., City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804-05 (1984)
(balancing speech interests in cardboard electionsigns against state interests of preventing clutter);
TRIBE, supra note 29, at § 12-2, at 791 (describing the balancing test for content-neutral
restrictions of speech).
97. TRIBE, supranote 29, § 12-2, at 791 (borrowing the image from Harry Kalven, Jr., The
Concept of the PublicForum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 28).
98. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983) (quoting NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware
Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982) (quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980))).
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shaping debate on public issues, it deserves "special protection."" The fact
that whistleblowers may be speaking in violation of confidentiality agreements
does not make their speech of less concern to the First Amendment because
the First Amendment protects not only individual speakers, but public debate
in general."° This principle has a firm basis in our jurisprudence-regardless
of its relative prominence vis-d-vis more purely self-expressive theories of the
First AmendmentSt -commonly associated with Justice Brennan's exhortation in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan"° that the First Amendment requires
public discourse to remain "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open. "103
The way Jeffrey Wigand and other recent high-level tobacco whistleblowers have galvanized debate over the regulation of cigarettes 1 4 is
compelling testimony to the contribution whistleblowers can make to public
discourse; but these whisfleblowers are simply the most recent, visible
examples of a phenomenon whose importance to public debate and selfgovernance has been recognized for several decades. The development of a
spate of statutory and common-law protections for whistleblowers has signalled
a recognition that an informed public depends on having access to certain vital

99. Id.

100. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988) ("At the heart of
the First Amendment is the recognition of the fundamental importance of the free flow of ideas
and opinions on matters of public interest and concern."); First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S.
765, 783 (1978) ("The First Amendment goes beyond protection of the press and the selfexpression of individuals to prohibit government from limiting the stock of information from
which members of the public may draw."); see also supranote 86 (listing a few of the prominent
scholarly treatments of this issue).
101. Professors Fiss and Sunstein, among others, have discussed and criticized the
unwillingness of the Court to support a vision of the First Amendment that would emphasize the
'public debate" imperative at the expense of unbridled expressive autonomy. See FISS, supra
note 86; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (1993). This
unwillingness does not affect the argumenthere because, unlike the issues discussed by Professors
Fiss and Sunstein, the contribution to public debate made by whistleblowers does not come at the
expense of any of the employer's First Amendment expressive interests. Whatever interests an
employer may have in keeping certain business practices confidential, they are certainly not First
Amendment interests.
102. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
103. Id. at 270. The idea that a vibrant marketplace of information is indispensable to a
healthy and legitimate system of self-governmentwas prominent in the minds of the Framers
themselves. See, e.g., 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 103 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910),
quoted in Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867 (1982) ("A popular Government, without
popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy ....
And a people who mean to be their own Governors, must arm themselves with the
power which knowledge gives.").
104. See, e.g., Timothy Noah & Suein L. Hwang, PhilipMorris, in Voluminous Comment,
DeniesManipulating CigaretteNicotine, WALL ST. J., Apr. 23, 1996, at A24 (discussing the
FDA's release of new regulations for tobacco products as a reaction to allegations by three
former employees of Philip Morris that the company manipulates nicotine levels).
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information passed through the workplace. 5 Whistleblowers inform the
public on matters ranging from consumer fraud, to product safety, to
environmental protection."1° In many cases, this information would otherwise
remain hidden from the public entirely. Therefore, whistleblowers not only
make important contributions to public debate, but they often perform the
critical role of sparking debate where none previously existed. Consequently,
they are deserving of robust First Amendment protection, as is well captured
by the oft-quoted dictum from Thornhill v. Alabama:10 1 "Freedom of
discussion, if it would fulfill its historic function in this nation, must embrace
all issues about which information is needed or appropriate to enable the
members of society to cope with the exigencies of their period."108
Whistleblowers may legitimately claim First Amendment protection not

only because of their contribution to public debate, but also because of the
significant interest in self-expression that is jeopardized when they are
silenced. The fact that employees sign away their right to speak may make this
interest less compelling than the interest in enhancing public discourse, but the
silence employees thought they were agreeing to might be very different from
the silence ultimately expected of them."° More importantly, the waiver
itself is only valid if it does not unduly compromise free speech.110 The
expressive interests of whistleblowers are in many ways unique, and are
therefore another important consideration beyond the concern for public
discourse.
Whistleblowing is a compelling form of self-expression because it is an
act that is critical to the employee-speaker's identity as citizen. Deciding to
speak out for the public's benefit, despite possible recriminations not only
from one's employer but also from co-workers, neighbors, and family
members, presumably for most whistleblowers is among the most intense and
indeed the most politically charged choices the employee is ever likely to
make.1 ' An individual who decides to blow the whistle becomes personally
involved in a public issue in a way that finds few counterparts for the ordinary
citizen. 1 Such involvement is a form of self-expression that our constitu-

105. For one of the many discussions of the development of whistleblower protection law,
see WESTMAN, supra note 11.
106. For an in-depth treatment of the contributions and experiences ofa number of influential
whistleblowers, see MYRON PERETZ GLAZER & PENINA MIGDAL GLAZER, THE WHISTLEBLOWERS (1989).
107. 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
108. Id. at 102.
109. See supra Part III.A.
110. See supra Part III.B.
111. See generally GLAZER & GLAZER, supra note 106 (discussing personal tribulations of
individual whistleblowers).
112. Of course, certain instances of whistleblowing may result not from agonized choices
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tional system should not lightly permit to be bargained away. As Professor
Sunstein has observed, "Liberal republicanism prizes citizenship. . . . [I]t
that some people
refuses to treat political participation as simply another 'taste'
11 3
,
democracy.
well-functioning
a
in
dispensable
as
have, or
B.

State Interests FavoringEnforcement

The state has essentially the following three types of interests in
enforcing employee confidentiality agreements: the general interest in contract
enforcement, the protection of property rights, and the preservation of
fiduciary duties. Not only are these interests insufficient as a general matter
to justify substantial impairments of speech such as those at issue here, 114 but
these interests lose much of their influence when asserted to bar the public
from having access to information important to the public's well-being and
capacity for self-governance. Although the factors discussed in Part IV.C
could influence the proper outcome of a given case, the state interests in
enforcing employee confidentiality agreements should generally give way to
the more compelling interests in free speech.
The state's interests in freedom ofcontract and allowing parties to rely
on the enforcement of contractual obligations cannot warrant substantial
impairments of speech. While important, these interests, unlike the interest in
free speech, have not been considered central constitutional values since the
fall of the Lochner"' era." 6 Revealingly, under the Due Process Clause,
interference with economic expectations receives only the most minimal
scrutiny," 7 while restrictions on speech are accorded the heightened scrutiny

appropriate to the First Amendment's favored position in our constitutional
order." 8 The state's interest in contract enforcement is represented by the

about one's role as a citizen, but from an employee's animus toward the employer. See, e.g.,
MICELI & NEAR, supra note 95, at 1 (noting the view that whistleblowers are "company traitors
who reveal secrets for their own personal glorification"). However, as long as the disclosures are
truly of public import, the employee (if less noble) still performs an important role as a citizen
and still possesses legitimate expressive interests in speaking out-even if personal fame or
fortune is the primary catalyst. Additionally, motivation has little, if any, relevance to the
contribution to public discourse. See infra text accompanying notes 145-49 (discussing employee
motivation as a factor in the First Amendment balancing).

113.

SUNSTEIN,

supra note 39, at 135.

114. See supra Part IV.A.

115. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
116. See TRIBE, supra note 29, §§ 8-6, 8-7, 11-1.
117. See, e.g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 83-84
(1978) (applying the rational basis test); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963)
(deferring to state legislature regarding criminalizing "business of debt adjusting" because
Lochner and progeny have "long since been discarded").
118.
Wlithout freedom of expression, thought becomes checked and
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common-law presumption in favor of enforcing contracts; but like other
principles of common law,119 this interest must accommodate the higher

demands of the First Amendment. Even when the First Amendment is not at
issue, contract law provides ample room for countervailing policies to trump
the general presumption of contract enforceability," 0 making it all the more
clear that this presumption must give way to core constitutional values, such
as free speech, when a conflict between the two exists.
More basically, the state's interest in contract enforcement is only a
relevant interest when a, contract is one that the state would deem properly
enforceable. Thus, asserting the interest in contract enforcement as a basis for
enforcing contracts that arguably offend public policy or constitutional
principles largely begs the question. One cannot argue for the enforcement of
employee confidentiality agreements simply on the basis of vindicating the
parties' expectations because these expectations are precisely what are
at issue-the question being what may properly be expected regarding the free
speech rights of employees. To argue for the enforcement of employee
confidentiality agreements that impair public discourse, one must look beyond
121
the interest in contract enforcement itself.
However, even when we look beyond the interest in contract enforce-

ment, the additional state interests supporting the enforcement of employee
confidentiality agreements, namely the protection of the employer's property
rights and the fiduciary relationship between employer and employee,
generally fail to overcome the significant interests in free speech at stake. The
Supreme Court has made clear that "[w]hen we balance the Constitutional
rights of owners of property against those of the people to enjoy [First
Amendment freedoms], . . . we remain mindful of the fact that the latter
occupy a preferred position. " 1

atrophied. Therefore, in considering what interests are so fundamental
as to be enshrined in the Due Process Clause, those liberties of the
individual which history has attested as the indispensable conditions
of an open as against a closed society come to this Court with a
momentum for respect lacking when appeal is made to liberties which
derive merely from shifting economic arrangements.
Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 95 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
119. See cases cited supra note 15.
120. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 8 (1981) (including public policy,
restraint of trade, commission of tort, and violation of fiduciary duties as grounds for
unenforceability).
121. Cf. Davies v. Grossmont Union High Sch. Dist., 930 F.2d 1390, 1398 (9th Cir. 1991)
(arguing that some important public interest other than an interest in contract enforcement must
be asserted before waiver of constitutional rights can survive scrutiny under Town of Newton v.
Rumery, 480 U.S. 386 (1987)).
122. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946). See generally Frank I. Michelman,
Liberties, Fair Values, and ConstitutionalMethod, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS INTHE MODERN
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The Court has given fiduciary duties substantial weight in cases involving
the free speech of public employees where the preservation of such duties is
linked to the government employer's interest in effectively fulfilling its public
responsibilities."
However, when private fiduciary relationships are
at issue, the calculus changes drastically. In such cases, preserving the
employer-employee relationship and ensuring the loyalty and effectiveness of
employees has no direct bearing upon the government's ability to serve as
custodian of the public interest. Although the state has a broad interest in the
efficiency of private enterprises-an interest vitally dependent upon the
preservation of the employer-employee fiduciary relationship '24-in the case
of a given private employer this interest boils down to little more than an
interest in protecting the employer's property, which again cannot ordinarily
pass muster under the First Amendment.'" If the state has a legitimate
interest in the loyalty of its own employees-without which it could not as
effectively perform its public functions-it does not have a strong interest in
patrolling private employees' sense of loyalty to their employers for loyalty's
sake, particularly when individuals' decisions to disclose confidential
information reflect a choice between individuals' duties as employees and their
duties as citizens.
Moreover, the particular property rights and fiduciary duties implicated
here are of dubious value even on their own terms because the rights and
duties are based on keeping the public ignorant of matters on which the
public's well-being depends. The strength of property claims generally
diminishes as the public's interest in the property increases, a principle
recognized not only by our due process jurisprudence,' 26 but-of more direct
91-114 (Geoffrey R. Stone et al. eds., 1992) (defending the preferred place of the First
Amendment over property rights in our constitutional scheme). The preferred place of the First
Amendment is not altered because the Court failed to extend Marsh to cover modem-day
STATE

shopping centers in cases that famously and controversially addressed the conflict between
property and speech. See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 520-21 (1976) (holding picketers had
no First Amendment right to advertise a strike igainst their employer in a shopping mall where
the employer was a lessee); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 564-66 (1972) (finding
handbill distributors had no entitlement to exercise First Amendment rights in a privately owned
shopping center). Nor are these cases, which only addressed whether a particular forum should
be considered public or private, relevant here. Employee confidentiality agreements do not raise
a "forum" issue at all, but concern whether certain speech may be withheld from the public
altogether.
123. See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 675 (1994) (plurality opinion). See generally
John E. Theuman, Annotation, Public Employee's Right of Free Speech Under Federal
Constitution's First Amendment-Supreme Court Cases, 97 L. ED. 2d 903, 912-14 (1989)
(summarizing Supreme Court cases that have balanced the government's legitimate interests in
regulating the speech of its employees against the employee's interest in expressive freedom).
124. See Nicholas M. Rongine, Toward a Coherent Legal Response to the Public Policy
Dilemma Posed by Whistleblowing, 23 AM. Bus. L.J. 281, 284 (1985).
125. See text accompanying note 122.
126. Cf. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 523, 539 (1934) (holding that a statute allowing
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relevance here-by the exceptions carved out of the various forms of trade
secret protection law to allow disclosures in the public interest.127 Like the
law of trade secret protection, the common law of agency also recognizes a
privilege to use or disclose confidential information for "the protection of a
superior interest."128 In addition to their fiduciary duties as employees,
individuals have competing duties as citizens which the state presumably has
at least as great an interest in promoting. The various forms of whistleblower
protection2 9 signal a recognition by Congress, state legislatures, and courts
that in many instances the employee's duties as a citizen are paramount.
The property and agency interests in preventing employees from
disclosing confidential information that is of legitimate concern to the public
are relatively weak by common-law standards. When First Amendment
scrutiny is applied, this weakness becomes fatal-except where the circumstances of a particular case weigh so heavily in favor of enforcement and
against the First Amendment interests that the ordinary position of the scales
is tipped. This article now turns to the factors that may influence the proper
outcome of a given case.

C. FactorsAffecting the Balancing
Not surprisingly, the predominant factor that should influence the
outcome of the First Amendment balancing is the importance of the particular
disclosure to public debate as compared with its importance to the employer.

a milk control board to fix the price of milk did not violate due process, and observing that
"[e]qually fundamental with the private right is that of the public to regulate it in the common
interest"); Breardv. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 632-33 (1951) (finding that ordinance restricting
certain type of door-to-doorpeddling did not violate due process by burdening petitioners' ability
to engage in their occupations).
127. See Terry Morehead Dworkin & Elletta Sangrey Callahan, Employee Disclosuresto the
Media: When Is a "Source" a "Sourcerer"?,15 HASTONGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 357, 387-89
(1993).
128. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 395 cmt. f (1958). The only example of a
privileged disclosure given by the RESTATEMENT involves criminal activity, see id., leading some
to contend that the RESTATEMENT meant to extend the privilege no further than criminal acts. See
Phillip I. Blumberg, CorporateResponsibilityandtheEmployee'sDuty ofLoyalty andObedience:
A PreliminaryInquiry, 24 OKLA. L. REv. 279, 286-87 (1971). The fact that this example is the
only one given does not warrant the conclusion that it is exclusive, nor would such a limitation
be tenable given that the public interest can be far more greatly affected by certain harmful
activity that is not strictly illegal than by minor criminal offenses. In any case, this article does
not rely on the RESTATEMENT to defend employee disclosures, but rather on the First
Amendment, which protects all information relevant to self-governance-not merely express
violations of law. The RESTATEMENT'S position that confidential information can be disclosed by
an agent to protect a superior interest, however ambiguous its reach, merely reinforces that the
common-law interests opposing the First Amendment are divided within their own ranks.
129. See WESTMAN, supra note 11.
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In many cases, these two criteria may coincide-that is, the employer's interest
in keeping the information private is strong because of the great importance
the public would assign to it if it were provided access. 130 In such cases, the
preferred position of the First Amendment in our constitutional system should
protect disclosure despite the employer's interests. 31 Only when the
employer's property interest in the information is strong and the public's
interest in the information is relatively weak should confidentiality agreements
be enforced.
In practice, determining whether and to what degree a particular
disclosure constitutes a matter of public concern will often be a difficult
task. 132 Indeed, this task is an undertaking that some members of the Court
33
have considered the judiciary ill-suited to perform in certain contexts.
Ultimately, determining whether a particular disclosure involves a matter of
public concern requires sensitivity to the circumstances of the individual
case. 134 However, some general precepts provide guidance.
First, to be protected by the First Amendment, a disclosure should be of
concern to the public not merely because it is newsworthy in some respect, but
in the stronger sense that it has an appreciable impact on the public's capacity
for informed self-governance. This conclusion is proper because it is the First
Amendment's protection of public discourse and collective self-determination
that largely provides the rationale 35for holding confidentiality agreements
enforceable against whistleblowers.1
Even information that has a more significant instrumental value to the
public than news which merely satisfies public curiosity might not deserve
protection unless the public's failure to have such information would distort
public decision making in some way. 36 For example, reporting that an

130. See Estlund, supra note 89, at 133.
131. Cf. Estlund, supra note 89, at 133 ("mhe speech the law protects often harms the
employer for the very reason for which it is protected: It brings information to the public...
that may threaten the employer's chosen way of doing business.").
132. See WEsTmAN, supra note 11, at 34 & n.41.
133. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346 (1974); Rosenbloom v.
Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 79 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting). But see Connick v. Myers,
461 U.S. 138, 146-49 (1983) (holding that courts should inquire into whether a public employee
spoke on a matter of public concern to determine the constitutionality of terminating public
employees); Gertz, 418 U.S. at 368-69 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that in determining
what is an issue of public interest courts "would only be performing one of their traditional
functions," even if it "would not always be easy").
134. Cf. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48 ("Whether an employee's speech addresses a matter

of public concern must be determined by the content, form, and context of a given statement, as
revealed by the whole record.").
135. See supra Part IV.A.
136. Of course, although First Amendment protections would be less readily available to
these disclosures, a court would still remain free under the rubric of contract law to refuse to
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employer overcharged for its products or misled suppliers or competitors about
its future plans should not give rise to a First Amendment defense unless this
information was also relevant in some significant way to self-governance. Selfgovernance is a broad concept encompassing all kinds of informationincluding, for example, information needed to determine whether the
government is properly regulating certain industries or practices. As such, the
absence of any connection to self-governance is the rare case, and the focus
instead would normally be on the strength of the connection. Still, self-governance must remain the benchmark for First Amendment protection, as it is

largely the justification for such protection in the first place.
A second conclusion naturally follows from the understanding that selfgovernance and public debate are the proper criteria in determining
what speech the First Amendment protects from contractual liability. In
determining the scope of the protectible speech, courts should not limit
themselves to disclosures of illegal activity or disclosures that fall within the
current protections afforded whistleblowers in statutory and common-law
sources.' 37 The uninhibited public debate demanded by the First Amendment
cannot be limited by public policy as currently embodied in positive law
because such debate is essential to the continued legitimacy and development
of the law. Because the First Amendment is concerned with debate that is
properly constitutive of public policy, its protection should extend beyond the
comparatively narrow scope of public policy as currently encoded by the
legislature and as currently defined by the courts.
Apart from the problem of defiming whether disclosures are of public
concern, potential discrepancies are likely to emerge between the expected and
the actual public import of employee disclosures. 3 ' While neither a purely

enforce the contract on public policy grounds. See supra text accompanying notes 16-19.
137. In cases of whistleblower discharge, courts have often limited their inquiry in precisely
this way, refusing to find an exception to the employment-at-will doctrine unless the speech
at issue could be expressly pigeonholed within existing sources of whistleblower protection. See,
e.g., Wagner v. General Elec. Co., 760 F. Supp. 1146, 1153 (E.D. Pa. 1991) ("Absent a legally
recognized public policy exception to employment at-will,... this Court ...would be in error
to allow an action for wrongful discharge to proceed."). This outcome is consistent with these
courts' failure to recognize the applicability of the First Amendment in such cases, a result
challenged above in the text accompanying notes 82-85. Even within the narrower field of vision
that remains once the First Amendment is disregarded, ignoring the public policy of supporting
public discourse when the speech at issue does not fall within narrowly prescribed statutory or
common-law categories is an unduly restrictive approach.
138. This question is different from whether the disclosures are factually correct. False
disclosures potentially subject whistleblowers to defamation claims. Defamation raises its own
host of FirstAmendment issues. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16.33-.35 (5th ed. 1995). Additionally, the extent to which common-law privileges
would shield whistleblowers from liability in the defamation context is unclear. See Rditzel, supra
note 9, at 26-27. Because these questions are separate from the question of contractual liability,
they are beyond the scope of this paper. However, to the extent that disclosures are false, they
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objective nor a purely subjective measure of the public interest in a given
disclosure would be appropriate, a substantial objective component should be
required for the speech to be protected.39 Because the whistleblower's First
Amendment right to disclose confidential information depends largely on the
imperative of public debate, an actual contribution to the public should be a
condition of protection. However, a purely objective approach that failed to
credit in any way an employee's subjective, yet reasonable, expectations about
the importance of the information disclosed would unduly chill speech.
Employees can never be completely certain of the impact their revelations will
ultimately have upon the public, and some room for error must be preserved
so long as one has a reasonable expectation of contributing to public debate.
Consideration of the public interest in the disclosures-which breeds
questions as to how public interest is to be defined and according to
what standard it is to be measured-is only one factor (albeit the most crucial
one) among many that may influence the First Amendment calculus. Other
factors will be relevant to the strength of the contractual and fiduciary interests
that can be asserted in favor of enforcing the contract. For example, one
relevant consideration is how specifically the agreement identified the
information an employee was obliged to keep confidential, with more detailed

agreements giving rise to more substantial contractual claims. 4 ° The amount
of negotiation, if any, that took place regarding the confidentiality agreement
should also affect the strength of the contractual interests because in-depth
discussions regarding the true intent of the parties are more likely to guarantee
a knowing, intelligent14 waiver. Whether the contract was signed at the
inception of the employment relationship or as part of a severance package
may also be relevant. Agreements signed upon the termination of employment
raise stronger contractual claims because employees will have been on notice
as to the speech rights being relinquished-although allowance must be made
for the possibility that the public significance of certain information is not
recognized until later.
Regarding the interest in preserving fiduciary relationships, the
employment position held by the whistleblower may be relevant because
higher-level employees are often held to owe a correspondingly higher level

will not be objectively relevant to the public's capacity for self-governance and would therefore
lose First Amendment protection from contractual liability under the standard established here.
See infra text accompanying note 140.
139. This component of objective public significance should be required of all the information
disclosed, excluding such information that would be unreasonably difficult for employees to avoid
relaying while still being able to disclose the publicly important material.
140. Cf. supra Part III.A (discussing the problem of the proper inferences that can be drawn
regarding employees' understandings ofthe scope of broadly framed confidentiality agreements).
141. See supra Part III.A.
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of fiduciary duty.' 42 Whether or not the information disclosed was likely to
be transmitted to the public regardless of the employee's intervention would

also be a relevant consideration. If the public was likely to obtain the
information anyway, contractual liability would be more justifiable because it
would allow the maximum protection of the fiduciary relationship consistent
with the requirement that public debate remain "uninhibited, robust, and wideopen."' 4 3 None of the factors discussed above clinches the balancing
test-because even strong contractual and fiduciary interests will ordinarily fall
to strong First Amendment interests-but all of these factors are relevant to the
overall balancing a court would need to perform.
However, some factors are generally considered important in assessing
the ethical dimensions of whistleblowing and the appropriateness of protecting
whistleblowers from termination, but are less relevant in determining whether
enforcing a confidentiality agreement would violate the First Amendment. The
employee's motives, while often critical in whistleblower discharge cases
where the issue of loyalty is central,'" are less important when the question
is one of contract enforcement. For this reason, other factors that are
significant in discharge cases as reflections upon the employee's motives-such
as the outlet to whom the information is disclosed 45 and the efforts made to
exhaust internal remedies prior to disclosure' 46-are similarly irrelevant here.
Contract law is not concerned with the motivation behind the breach as
long as the contract is enforceable. "'4 The question when an employee like
Wigand breaches a confidentiality agreement is whether it is enforceable in the
first place, given the burdens the contract would place upon public discourse.
The First Amendment is likewise unconcerned with the employee's motives
because the effect of a given disclosure upon public debate will be largely the
same regardless of an employee's reasons for speaking out. Ill-motivated
disclosures might be less prudently made and therefore less likely to satisfy the
requirement that disclosures be substantially and objectively relevant to the
public,' 48 but this possibility differs from the argument that the First Amend142. See WESTMAN, supra note 11, at 24.
143. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
144. See WESTMAN, supra note 11, at 43-44.
145. See Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 127, at 378-79. Although inconsistencies exist
between different sources of whistleblower protection, see id. at 379, the general tendency has
been to treat disclosures to public authorities more favorably than those to the media, see id.
at 364. The thinking behind this trend appears to be that a whistleblower who goes directly to
the media is more likely to be an unreliable speaker seeking publicity, rather than one genuinely
and reliably acting in the public interest. See generally id. at 364 (discussing fact that reporting
to media is not favored).
146. See WESTMAN, supra note 11, at 38-39.
147. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 17, § 12.8, at 190.
148. Such disclosures are also more likely to expose the employee to a defamation suit. See
supra note 138.
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ment is less solicitous of speech based on the disloyal motives of the speaker.
V.

MODERN SUPREME COURT CASES APPEARING TO SUGGEST
ENFORCEABILITY

Three modem Supreme Court cases that required the First Amendment
to yield to interests in confidentiality might be considered particularly relevant
to the question of the enforceability of employee confidentiality agreements:
Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.,
Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart,'150 and
Snepp v. United States.'
These cases could foreseeably be cited in a
number of different ways in support of the argument that enforcing employee
confidentiality agreements against whistleblowers is generally unobjectionable.
This part of the article explains why these cases support no such proposition.
A.

Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.

Cohen arose in the context of a Minnesota gubernatorial race. Dan
Cohen, a well-known supporter of the Independent Republican Party

campaign, approached reporters and offered to give them potentially damaging
information regarding the opposing party's candidate for Lieutenant Governor.' He offered to provide the information only on the condition of
anonymity. 5 1 The newspaper editors later determined that Cohen's identity
was a newsworthy aspect of the story and revealed him as the source of the
information. 154 The state supreme court "balance[d] the constitutional rights
of a free press against the common law interest in protecting a promise of
anonymity" 55 and determined that the promise the reporter made to Cohen
was unenforceable. In a brief five-to-four opinion, the United States Supreme
Court reversed the state supreme court and held that the First Amendment did
not bar Cohen from recovering damages from the newspaper under state
promissory estoppel law.' 56
After concluding that state action was present in the lower court's
enforcement of the agreement, the Court based its opinion on the "wellestablished line of decisions holding that generally applicable laws do not
offend the First Amendment simply because their enforcement against the

149. 501 U.S. 663 (1991).
150. 467 U.S. 20 (1984).
151. 444 U.S. 507 (1980).
152. See Cohen, 501 U.S. at 665.

153. See id.
154. See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 457 N.W.2d 199, 200-01 (Minn. 1990).
155. Id. at 205.
156. See Cohen, 501 U.S. 663, 665 (1991).
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press has incidental effects on its ability to gather and report the news. "157
Arguing that the press was not privileged to violate laws of general applicability, the Court found that the promise was enforceable without engaging in any
First Amendment balancing whatever. If speech were chilled, this result was
"no more than the incidental, and constitutionally insignificant, consequence
of applying to the press a generally applicable law that requires those who
58
make certain kinds of promises to keep them." S
The Court's very framing of the issue as a rejection of "press privilege"
is problematic. As Justice Blackmun points out in dissent, the opinion of the
Minnesota Supreme Court did "not. . .create any exception to, or immunity
from, the laws of that State for members of the press. . . . [T]he court's
decision [was] premised, not on the identity of the speaker, but on the speech
itself. ""' State promissory estoppel law should accommodate the demands
of the First Amendment not because a reporter made the promise, but because
the promise itself threatened public discourse." The Court has consistently
held that when common-law causes of action threaten to chill public debate,
the interests supporting them must be weighed against the harm caused to the
First Amendment.16 1 In refusing to apply state promissory estoppel law to
penalize the publication of newsworthy political information, the state court
did not carve out a privilege for the press, but merely adhered to the privilege
demanded by the First Amendment whenever public debate is directly
threatened by any regime of law, however broadly applicable.
Neither does the application of contract or promissory estoppel law to
vows of silence on matters of public concern constitute an "incidental, and
constitutionally insignificant" 162 threat to public debate. Whatever might be
said for the limitations placed upon the press in the cases relied upon by the
majority, in which the press was found to have no privilege to violate the
NLRA, 163 to ignore the antitrust laws,' 61 to refuse to pay non-discriminatory taxes,' 15 or to respond to a grand jury subpoena," imposing liability
157. Id. at 669.
158. Id. at 672.
159. Id. at 673 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
160. Cf. id. ("Necessarily, the First Amendment protection [that should have been] afforded
respondents would be equally available to nonmedia defendants.").
161. See supra text accompanying note 15; see also Cohen, 501 U.S. at 677 (Souter, J.,
dissenting) ("'ITihere is nothing talismanic about neutral laws of general applicability'. . . for
such laws may restrict First Amendment rights just as effectively as those directed specifically
at speech itself.'" (quoting EmploymentDiv. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 901 (1990) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring))).
162. Cohen, 501 U.S. at 672.
163. Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937).
164. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
165. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
166. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
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based on the disclosure of publicly important information is of an entirely
different constitutional magnitude. 67
Additionally, a principled distinction exists between journalist-source and
employer-employee confidentiality agreements. Had Cohen properly engaged
in the balancing required by the First Amendment, it could legitimately have
found that enforcing the agreement was entirely consistent with the First
Amendment. Journalist-source confidentiality agreements arguably support
public debate by encouraging sources to come forward with information. A
plausible argument exists that enforcing such agreements, which are critical to
the effective functioning of the press, actually benefits the marketplace of
speech in the long run. 1 The imperative of robust public debate, quite
simply, exists on both sides of the issue of whether to enforce journalist-source
confidentiality agreements. In contrast, employee confidentiality agreements
serve the instrumental interests of the employer in keeping certain information
private, but do nothing to advance the cause of public discourse.
Cohen touches upon two additional issues relevant to the enforceability
of employee confidentiality agreements in ways that require explanation. The
first is the issue of waiver. Although the Court never addressed this question
directly, it criticized Justice Blackmun's reliance on cases such as FloridaStar
v. B.J.F. 6 9 and Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co. 7° by noting that:
In those cases, the State itself defined the content of publications
that would trigger liability. Here, by contrast, Minnesota law simply
requires those making promises to keep them. The parties themselves ... determine the scope of their legal obligations, and any
restrictions that may be placed on the publication of truthful information
are self-imposed.'
This emphasis on the self-imposition of speech restraints was made in the
context of distinguishing FloridaStar and Daily Mail Publishing Co. from the

167. See Cohen, 501 U.S. at 674-75 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
168. Cf. Farber, supra note 89, at 576 ("[I]n the long run, applying promissory estoppel to
cases involving promises of confidentiality by members of the press should actually increase the
stock of public information."). Cowles Media relied on this very argument in its Supreme Court
brief, see Brief for Petitioner at 27-29, as did the dissenters in the State Supreme Court, see
Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 457 N.W.2d 199, 206 (Yetka, J., dissenting), 207 (Kelley, J.,
dissenting).
169. 491 U.S. 524, 541 (1989) (finding a First Amendment violation when damages were
imposed on a newspaper for publishing the name of a rape victim obtained from a publicly

released police report).
170. 443 U.S. 97, 103-06 (1979) (finding that a statute that makes a newspaper's act of
publishing the name of a charged juvenile offender a crime violative of the First Amendment).
171. Cohen, 501 U.S. at 670-71.
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case before the Court. 17 Because those cases applied strict scrutiny to laws
prohibiting the reporting of certain kinds of truthful information, the Court's
distinction should be regarded merely as a way of explaining why strict
scrutiny, which Justice Blackmun seemed to consider to be appropriate in
Cohen, 17 3 was not warranted. This rejection of strict scrutiny in itself is not
problematic and indeed is not inconsistent with the approach taken in this
article to apply intermediate scrutiny. 74
However, the Court's remarks about the self-imposition of speech
restraints should not be read as sanctioning the free waivability of First
Amendment rights-a proposition that the Court never addressed. The Court's
failure to engage in any First Amendment scrutiny in Cohen was not grounded

upon an argument that First Amendment rights had been waived, but on the

problematic notion that the press was not to be "privileged."" 7 Indeed,
Justice Souter was correct to point out in dissent that the Court's "suggest[ion]
[of] the possibility of waiver"-"suggestion" itself being a proper characterization of the majority's cursory treatment of the issue 176 --was misguided
because the formal requirements for waiver had not been met.'" More
importantly, he was correct to argue that the very notion of waiving the right
to participate in public debate is problematic because it is based upon "a
conception of First Amendment rights as those of the speaker alone, with a
value that may be measured without
reference to the importance of the
78
discourse."'1
public
to
information
In distinguishing Florida Star and Daily Mail Publishing Co. from
Cohen, the Court also addressed the question of whether information gained
by virtue of a promise of confidentiality is "lawfully" obtained. 179 Whereas
Florida Star and Daily Mail Publishing Co. had applied strict scrutiny to
restrictions upon the publication of truthful, lawfully obtained information, the
Court remarked that "it is not at all clear that respondents obtained Cohen's
name 'lawfully' in this case, at least for purposes of publishing it."180 The
Court did not expressly hold that such information was unlawfully obtained
and that its disclosure was therefore unprotected, nor would it have been
justified in doing so.' 8 ' (Indeed, even where information has been unlawfully

172. See id.
173. See id. at 676 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (requiring compelling state interest).
174. See supra text accompanying notes 95-97.
175. See Cohen, 501 U.S. at 670.
176. See id. at 671 (noting restrictions placed on publication were "self-imposed").
177. Id. at 677 (Souter, J., dissenting).
178. Id. at 677-78; see also supra Part III.C.
179. See Cohen, 501 U.S. at 671.
180. Id.
181. While access to the relevant information in Cohen was gained by virtue of a
confidentiality agreement that was later breached, nothing is strictly illegal about this means of
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obtained, whether its disclosure can be penalized separately is unclear.)"n
The Court's doubts about the means of acquisition, rather, simply
distinguished Cohen from cases where strict scrutiny had been considered
appropriate. As with the distinction regarding the self-imposition of speech
restraints, doubts about the means of acquisition were not the basis for the
Court's abandonment of First Amendment scrutiny altogether. Justice Souter
again properly clarified the issue, noting that "the circumstances of acquisition
are [not] irrelevant to the balance.., although they may go only to
what balances against, and not to diminish, the First Amendment value of any
particular piece of information."" In the case of employee confidentiality
agreements, incorporating the circumstances of acquisition into the balance is
precisely to account for the contract, property, and fiduciary interests that this
article has found insufficient as a general matter to justify silencing whistleblowers who have substantial contributions to make to public debate."
Cohen does not support the proposition that where access to information
is conditioned upon a breached promise of confidentiality, a court may
dispense with First Amendment balancing in considering whether such
information can be disclosed. However, a different Supreme Court case,
Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart,18 seems to suggest just such a conclusion.
B.

Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart

Seattle Times Co. upheld the constitutionality of a state rule of procedure'S -modeled upon the federal rulel T-permitting courts, upon a
showing of good cause, to issue protective orders that prohibit the dissemination of information obtained during pretrial discovery. 8' As such, Seattle
Times Co. might be read to stand for the proposition that where one does not
have an unbridled right of access to information, the First Amendment is not
offended if access is granted subject to the condition of confidentiality. 8 9
access. More fundamentally, whether disclosing information in violation of such contracts is
"unlawful," and hence arguably less than fully protected, depends on whether the contracts are
binding, which in turn can only be resolved after the First Amendment has been considered. Cf.
TREBE, supra note 29, § 12-21, at 966 n.6 ("Mhe appeal to legality as a talisman may in part
beg the access issue ... since the question of 'what is lawful?' cannot be answered without
reference to the first amendment.").
182. See Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 535 n.8 (1989).
183. Cohen, 501 U.S. at 679 (Souter, J., dissenting).
184. See sufira Part IV.B.
185. 467 U.S. 20 (1984).
186. WASH. SUPER. CT. Civ. R. 26(c).
187. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
188. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 37 (1984).
189. Notably, the petitioner in Cohen relied on Seattle Times Co. (along with Snepp) to argue
that "the First Amendment does not bestow a right to publish information in violation of
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Such a broad reading would misconstrue the actual holding of Seattle Times
Co. and would fail to account for the special circumstances of that case.
The Court in Seattle Times Co. did not find that the First Amendment
was unconcerned with information obtained pursuant to court discovery merely
because confidentiality was a prerequisite to access. Rather, the Court applied
intermediate scrutiny to the rule governing protective orders, but considered
the particular state interests involved sufficient to pass muster.'9g These
interests, as well as the First Amendment interests at stake in Seattle Times
Co., are readily distinguishable from those implicated by employee confidentiality agreements. At issue in Seattle Times Co. was not merely the government's interest in protecting private information, but its substantial interest in
preserving the integrity of its judicial processes. In the absence of protective
orders, that integrity would be jeopardized by the ability of private parties to
abuse our liberal system of discovery in order to extract private information
from other parties and disclose it to the world."I In the face of such
potential for abuse, parties might be inclined to avoid litigation altogether,
thereby also placing in jeopardy the fundamental right of individuals to have
access to the state courts'--another critical interest influencing Seattle
Times Co.'s defense of protective orders.'93
Not only does the strength of the state interests involved distinguish
Seattle Times Co. from the issue at hand, but so does the manner in which the
confidential information is obtained. In overseeing the discovery process the
government itself extracts information from an involuntary source-at the
request of and for the benefit of another party-in order to fulfill its essential
function of resolving disputes. Because the state itself forces the release of
information-based on its own substantial interests in doing so and at the
expense of the possessor-it has a more legitimate interest in being able to
restrict public dissemination of that information. 194 Private employers,
conversely, are not forced by the state against their will to release information
to employees in order to satisfy exogenous state imperatives.

obligations willingly incurred through an agreement or through the acceptance of conditions by
which the information was obtained." Brief for Petitioner at 18-20.
190. See Seattle Times Co., 467 U.S. at 32-36.
191. See id. at 34-36; see also id. at 32 n.18 (citing other cases where special exigencies of
judicial system warranted restrictions on free speech).
192. See, e.g., Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 741 (1983) (noting
"that the right of access to the courts is an aspect of the First Amendment right to petition the
Government for redress of grievances").
193. See Seattle Times Co., 467 U.S. at 36 n.22.
194. See id. at 32. While such an interest is not entirely uncontroversial, see TRIE, supra
note 29, § 12-21, at 969 & n.21 (noting tension between Seattle Times Co. and the unconstitutional conditions doctrine), it is still a relevant distinction in considering the state's role in
restricting speech.
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On the other side of the balancing test, circumstances in Seattle Times
Co. that do not exist in the present context minimized the threat that the
confidentiality requirements in that case posed to the First Amendment. In
particular, protective orders such as those at issue in Seattle Times Co. do not
limit disclosure of the information if gained from sources other than pretrial
discovery 195-nor do they apply to information ultimately admitted at
trial.196 The silencing effect of employee confidentiality agreements, by
contrast, is likely to be more absolute, the agreements themselves evidencing
the employer's affirmative efforts to keep the information from the public.
At bottom, Seattle Times Co. simply manifests the principle noted by
Justice Souter in his Cohen dissent-that the means of acquiring information
are not irrelevant to the First Amendment analysis." 9 However, the case
does not suggest that when these means include a promise of confidentiality,
the First Amendment is therefore unconcerned with the information acquired.
The means of acquisition, again, "go only to what balances against, and not
to diminish, the First Amendment value of any particular piece of information."198 In Seattle Times Co. the means of acquisition implicated the state's
interests in ways readily distinguishable from the context of employee

whistleblowing and in a way less threatening to public debate.
C.

Snepp v. United States

Snepp is a third modem case susceptible to misreading regarding the
enforceability of confidentiality agreements at the First Amendment's expense.
The state appellate court in Cohen, for example, cited Snepp to argue
that "[tjhe United States Supreme Court has implicitly found the protection of
contractual rights to be a sufficient governmental interest to outweigh first
amendment rights.""' 9 The case concerned a book about the CIA published
by a former CIA employee without submitting it for prepublication clearance
as required by his employment contract. 200 The government conceded, for
195. See Seattle Times Co., 467 U.S. at 34.
196. See id. ("In sum, judicial limitations on a party's ability to disseminate information
discovered in advance of trial implicates the First Amendment rights of the restricted party to a
far lesser extent than would restraints on dissemination of information in a different context.").
197. See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 679 (1991) (Souter, J., dissenting).
198. Id.
199. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 445 N.W.2d 248, 257 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989). The
petitioner in Cohen also relied on Snepp (along with Seattle Times Co.) to argue that the First
Amendment does not protect the publication of information in violation of the conditions under
which it was obtained. See supra note 189. For another example of a case broadly misapplying
Snepp, see American Motors Corp. v. Huffstutler, 575 N.E.2d 116, 120 (Ohio 1991) (citing
Snepp and Seattle Times Co. for the propositionthat "[d]isclosureof confidential information does
not qualify for protection against prior restraint under the First Amendment").
200. See United States v. Snepp, 595 F.2d 926, 929 (4th Cir. 1979).
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purposes of its suit, that the book contained no classified information.2 " The
Fourth Circuit agreed with the district court that Snepp had breached his
employment contract, but found the imposition of a constructive trust on the
book's profits to be an inappropriate remedy because Snepp, having a First
Amendment right to publish unclassified information,' had no fiduciary
obligation to submit the book for prepublication clearance. 3 The Supreme
Court reversed on the issue of fiduciary obligation, citing the special trust
placed in Snepp as a CIA employee.' 4
Contrary to the impression of the state appellate court in Cohen, Snepp
has little if anything to do with contractual rights and their ability as a general
matter to trump free speech. The conclusion that the contract in Snepp was
enforceable had nothing to do with the imperative of contract enforcement
itself. Instead, the result stemmed from the compelling national security
concerns that the Court considered to have been at stake.2 5 Indeed, the
Court noted that the CIA could have imposed speech restrictions that would
have been unacceptable in other contexts "even in the absence of an express
agreement." 2' Likewise, the government did not contest the fact that the
contract generally could not prohibit Snepp from publishing unclassified
information.3 The real question in Snepp was not whether the contract
prevented Snepp from speaking," 8 but whether Snepp's fiduciary obligations
required him to consult with the CIA before going public with information that
he concededly had the right to disclose.
Even the Court's holding on the question of fiduciary duties, moreover,
does not translate to the context of whistleblowing by private employees
because, as with the contractual issue, the unique national security context was
determinative in Snepp. "Few types of governmental employment," the

201. See id.
202. See id. at 935. This conclusion followed from United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d

1309, 1317 (4th Cir. 1972).
203. See Snepp, 595 F.2d at 935-36.

204. See Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 510-11 (1980) (per curiam).
205. See id. at 509 n.3. While the Court noted that the contract was voluntarily signed as a
basis for its holding that the contract was enforceable, see id., this mention of voluntariness was
not an argument that First Amendment rights had been waived. What allowed the Court to
disregard Snepp's First Amendment objections was not any notion of waiver, but the
government's "compelling interest in protecting both the secrecy of information important to our
national security and the appearance of confidentiality so essential to the effective operation of
our foreign intelligence service." Id. The contract itself was simply "a reasonable means for
protecting this vital interest." Id.
206. Id.
207. See id. at 511.
208. The contract clearly did not prevent Snepp from speaking about unclassified matters,
and he could not speak on classified matters irrespective of the contract.
209. Apart from the bright distinction offered by the facts of Snepp, the case does not even
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Court remarked, "involve a higher degree of trust than that reposed in a CIA
employee with Snepp's duties."2' The Court deemed that the violation of
these duties endangered vital national security interests, impaired the CIA's
ability to fulfill its statutory mandate, and threatened irreparable harm to the
United States. 2 ' The tenuousness of any connection between Snepp and the
duties generally owed by employees who have signed confidentiality
agreements should be clear. In fact, the best testimony in this regard came
from the Court itself. Responding to the dissent's reference to a private

employee's covenant not to compete with his employer, the Court observed
that "[a] body of private law intended to preserve competition. . . simply has
no bearing on a contract made by the Director of the CIA in conformity with
his statutory obligation to 'protec[t] [sic] intelligence sources and methods

from unauthorized disclosure.'
VI.

"212

CONCLUSION '

The First Amendment substantially limits the enforceability of employee
confidentiality agreements against disclosures on matters of public concern.
First Amendment scrutiny is triggered because court enforcement of confidentiality agreements constitutes state action.2 3 Such scrutiny cannot be avoided
by arguing that the employee waived his First Amendment rights. Even if the
formal waiver requirements are met,21 4 courts must refuse to enforce waivers
of rights if the resultant harms would outweigh the interests in enforcement. 215 This balancing must be informed by the First Amendment interests
at stake; the mere existence of a contract cannot prevent these interests from
being considered in the first place. 211 More generally, the very idea of
waiving one's right to participate in public debate is problematic because
public discourse is the bedrock of our deliberative democracy and not the
bargaining chip of any single individual. 217 When courts apply First Amendment scrutiny to the enforcement of employee confidentiality agreements

directly address the question of the limits fiduciary duties (however compelling) may place upon
employee contributions to public debate. The case, again, only concerned whether Snepp was
required to clear with the CIA material that admittedly could be disclosed. If clearance had not
been granted, the burden would then have been on the government to seek an injunction. See id.
at 513 n.8.
210. Snepp, 444 U.S. at 511 n.6.
211. See id. at 511-13.
212. Id. at 513 n.9 (quoting 50 U.S.C. § 403(d)(3)).
213. See supra Part II.
214. See supra Part III.A.
215. See supra Part III.B.
216. See supra Part III.B.
217. See supra Part III.C.
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against whistleblowers, the First Amendment generally prevails-although a
number of relevant factors will affect the proper outcome of a given case. 21I
Nor should the three Supreme Court cases most relevant to the issue tip the
scales to any significant degree because they are each distinguishable in
important ways. 219
The fact that the First Amendment places limits on the enforceability of
contracts, whatever disputes exist over the proper scope of such limitations,
follows from the basic Legal Realist intuition that contract law necessarily
entails substantive choices by the state. In this respect, the issue bears an
interesting relationship to larger debates that have raged in recent years over
the future of the First Amendment. On subjects as diverse as campaign
finance, regulation of the broadcast media, pornography, and hate speech,
scholars have questioned a free market approach to speech rights that falsely
equates the substantive choices about speech ingrained in the status quo with
noninvolvement by the state. 2 ' As Professor Balkin has observed, these new
challenges
all involve techniques first used by the legal realists in the 1920s and
1930s to deconstruct the ideology of the sacred right of freedom of
contract. The only difference is that now the attack, the assault on the
citadel if you will, is directed at the sacred right of free speech. 22'
This article does not join in the new assault, but has the more modest ambition
of defending, in the name of free speech, what one would assume to have been longwon victories over the meaning of contract law itself. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.
suggests the danger of a regressive Lochnerism that views the enforcement of
contracts governing speech rights not as substantive state decisions about free speech
needing to be tested against the First Amendment, but rather as a decision to
"require[] those who make certain kinds of promises to keep them."2" Contrary
to the impression of the Court, such an approach is anything but "constitutionally
insignificant""' when the promises at issue threaten to restrict public debate.

218. See supra Part IV.C.
219. See supra Part V.
220. See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 86; CATHERINE A.

MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED:
DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 127-213 (1987); SUNSTEIN, supra note 101; Mari J. Matsuda,
Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2320

(1989). For one response to these arguments, see Charles Fried, The New First Amendment
Jurisprudence:A Threat to Liberty, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 225 (1992).
221. J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First
Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 379-80.

222. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 672 (1991).
223. Id.
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